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Abstract
We analyze how unemployment, job ﬁnding and job separation rates react
to neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks. Neutral shocks increase
unemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility; investment-
speciﬁc shocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hours
worked volatility. Movements in the job separation rates are responsible for the
impact response of unemployment while job ﬁnding rates for movements along
its adjustment path. The evidence warns against using models with exogenous
separation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technology
shocks in search and sticky price models.
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Since the pioneering contributions of Darby et al. (1985, 1986), Jackman et al. (1989),
and Blanchard and Diamond (1990), the literature has recognized the importance of
characterizing cyclical employment adjustment in terms of workers ﬂows in and out of
unemployment. The conventional wisdom has generally been that recessions, deﬁned
as periods of sharply rising unemployment, typically begin with a wave of layoﬀsa n d
persist over time because unemployed workers have hard time to ﬁnd new jobs. Hall
(2005) and Shimer (2007) have challenged this view by showing that, in the US over
the business cycle, there are substantial ﬂuctuations in the job ﬁnding rate (the rate
at which unemployed workers ﬁnd a job), while the job separation rate (the rate at
which employed workers lose their job) is comparatively acyclical. However, Yashiv
(2007), Fujita and Ramey (2009), and Elsby et al. (2009) looking at the same evi-
dence, attribute to the separation rate a larger role in characterizing US unemployment
ﬂuctuations. Since the conclusions these authors reach are based on unconditional cor-
relation analysis, the interpretation of the evidence is diﬃcult. First, it could be that
the response of the unemployment rate diﬀers depending on the source of the shock.
An unconditional analysis, lumping diﬀerent responses together, may mask such dif-
ferences. Second, it does not tell us how unemployment responds when important
business shocks occur. Third, it leaves open the question of what drives ﬂuctuations
in ﬁnding and separation rates and the contribution of technology shocks relative to
other source of ﬂuctuations. Fourth, it could be that the contribution of the ins and
outs of unemployment on impact and over the adjustment path are diﬀerent.
To address these issues, this paper analyzes the dynamics of the ins and outs of
unemployment during technology induced recessions. Since the pioneering work of
Kydland and Prescott (1982), many authors have suggested that technology shocks
are responsible for a large portion of the ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables and,
following recent literature (see Fisher 2006, and Michelacci and López-Salido 2007),
we focus attention on investment-neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks.
Technology shocks are identiﬁed in a VAR by imposing that investment speciﬁct e c h -
nological progress is the unique driving force for the secular trend in the relative price of
investment goods, while neutral and investment speciﬁc technological progress explain
1long-run movements in labor productivity. These restrictions follow directly from the
neoclassical growth model. We analyze the induced labor market dynamics along the
intensive margin (hours per-employee) and the extensive margin (number of employed
workers) and characterize unemployment dynamics in terms of the job separation rate
and the job ﬁnding rate.
As in Blanchard and Quah (1989) and in Fernald (2007), we recognize that low
frequency movements could give a misleading representation of the eﬀects of shocks.
This is a relevant concern since the growth rate of labor productivity and of the relative
price of investment goods exhibit signiﬁcant long run swings which have gone together
with important changes in unemployment, and labor market ﬂows. Many authors have
documented important changes in the pace of US technological progress over the post
WWII period, see for example, Greenwood and Yorokoglu (1997), Gordon (2000) and
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). These patterns have been greatly emphasized in the
literature on growth and wage inequality and growth and unemployment (see Aghion
and Howitt, 1994, Mortensen and Pissarides 1998, Violante, 2002, and Hornstein et
al., 2007, among others). Here we emphasize that it is important to account for these
patterns to correctly identify the eﬀects of technology shocks on labor market variables.
Neutral technology shocks having positive long run eﬀects on labour productivity,
substantially increase unemployment in the short run and aﬀect labor markets primarily
through the extensive margin. Positive investment speciﬁc technology shocks, on the
other hand, expand aggregate hours worked, both because hours per-worker increase
and because unemployment falls, but the intensive margin contributes most to the
adjustments. For neutral shocks, the impact response of unemployment is almost
entirely due to the instantaneous response of the separation rate while movements in
the ﬁnding rate account for the subsequent unemployment dynamics. Thus, positive
neutral shocks may cause recessions and the workers ﬂo w st h e yi n d u c ea r ei nl i n ew i t h
the conventional wisdom: unemployment initially rises because of a wave of layoﬀsa n d
remains high because the job ﬁnding rate takes time to recover.
The practical relevance of these ﬁndings depends on how important technology
shocks are for labor market ﬂuctuations and how accurately they represent important
historical episodes. On average, technology shocks explain more than 50 per cent of the
cyclical ﬂuctuations in labor market variables with neutral technology shocks mattering
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shocks more for hours per-worker volatility. In addition, neutral technology shocks
explain the recession of the late 80’s and the subsequent recovery of the early 90’s.
They initially rise the job separation and the unemployment rate; subsequently output
builds up until it reaches its new higher long run value, but over the transition path
employment remains below normal levels because the job ﬁnding rate is persistently
below its long run level –generating a “jobless”recovery, which is a distinctive feature
of this episode. The contribution of technology shocks to the jobless recoveries of the
2000’s is instead signiﬁcantly smaller.
These results are important for the literature analyzing business cycle in the labor
market through the lenses of search models. In fact, they provide a healthy warning to
the ongoing tendency to analyze the eﬀects of technology shocks in search models with
exogenous separation rates, a point also made by Ramey (2008). They also challenge
the conventional way to model technology shocks in search models (see, e.g., Shimer,
2007), both because the labor market responses to neutral and investment speciﬁct e c h -
nology shocks are diﬀerent and because neutral technology shocks are contractionary
rather than expansionary on employment (see also Balleer, 2010).
Our evidence also challenges the standard sticky-price explanation for why hours fall
in response to neutral technology shocks, see for example Galí (1999). In sticky-price
models, when technology improves and monetary policy is not accommodating enough,
demand is sluggish to respond and ﬁrms take advantage of technology improvements
to economize on labor input. While there is very little empirical evidence comparing
the cost of ﬁring and the costs of changing prices, the mechanism naturally applies to
the intensive margin since displacing workers is likely to be more costly than changing
prices–due to both the direct cost of ﬁring and the value of the sunk investment in
training and in job speciﬁc human capital that is lost with workers displacement.
Finally, our ﬁndings that neutral technology shocks are contractionary on employ-
ment and the fall in hours is related to the time consuming process of reallocation
of workers across jobs,while investment speciﬁc technology shocks are expansionary,
challenge the wisdom conventional models provide. The ﬁnding however are fully con-
sistent with the Schumpeterian view that the introduction of new neutral technologies
causes the destruction of technologically obsolete productive units and the creation
3of new technologically advanced ones. As shown by Caballero and Hammour (1994,
1996), and Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) when the labor market is characterized
by search frictions, these adjustments can cause unemployment. Thus, our ﬁndings
support the view by Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) that neutral technological
progress prompts waves of Schumpeterian creative destruction, where outdated, tech-
nologically obsolete productive units are pruned out of the productive system, while
investment-speciﬁc technology shocks lead to an expansion in economic activity, be-
cause a substantial proportion of old jobs upgrade their capital equipment and reap
the beneﬁts of the most recent advancements in capital equipment.
We are not the ﬁrst to analyze labor market dynamics using conditional responses.
Michelacci and López-Salido (2007), Ravn and Simonelli (2007), Barnichon (2010,
2011) and Balleer (2010) have also used long-run restrictions in SVARs to identify the
eﬀects of technology shocks on job and worker ﬂows, vacancies and unemployment.1
Braun et al. (2009) and Fujita (2011), on the other hand, have used sign restricted
SVARs to study the labor market response to structural shocks but the restrictions they
use are not necessarily satisﬁed if technology shocks have Schumpeterian features. In
addition, we emphasize that to identify the eﬀects of technology shocks using long run
restrictions it is important to take care of the low frequency movements in the growth
rate of productivity and of the price of investment observed in the data and that the
eﬀects of neutral shocks on labor market variables are strongly at variance with the
dynamics implied by technology shocks, as modelled in the conventional search model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, the
empirical model, and the consequences of low frequency comovements in the variables.
Section 3 presents basic results. Section 4 quantiﬁes the relative contribution of job
separation rates to the dynamics of technological unemployment. Section 5 measures
the contribution of technology shocks to labor market ﬂuctuations. Section 6 interprets
the results in light of existing work. Section 7 examines robustness. Section 8 concludes.
1This paper bears similarities with Michelacci and López-Salido (2007). We complements their
work in three ways: we consider workers ﬂow data rather than using job creation and job destruction
rates; the labor market ﬂows we use are representative of the whole US economy rather then just the
manufacturing sector; the datset is a longer and more informative.
42 The empirical model
Let Xt be a n × 1 vector of variables and let X1t and X2t be the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the price of investment, qt, and labor productivity ynt, respectively. Let Xt = D(L)ηt
be the (linear) Wold representation of Xt,w h e r eD(L) has all its roots inside the unit
circle and E (ηtη0
t)=Ση. We assume that the reduced form shocks ηt and the structural
shocks  t are related via ηt = S t, where S is a full rank matrix, that the structural
shocks  t are uncorrelated and let E ( t 0
t)=I. Thus, impulse responses represent the
eﬀects of one-standard deviation shocks. To identify the shocks of interest, we use
the restrictions that the non-stationarities in qt originate exclusively from investment
speciﬁc technology shocks and that the non-stationarities in ynt are entirely produced by
investment speciﬁc and neutral technology shocks. Hence, a neutral technology shock
(a yn- s h o c k )i st h es h o c kh a v i n gz e r ol o n g - r u ne ﬀects on the relative price of investment
goods and non-negligible long-run eﬀects on labor productivity; an investment speciﬁc
technology shock (a q-shock) aﬀects the long-run level of both labor productivity and
the price of investment; and no other shock has long-run eﬀects on these two variables.
This implies that the ﬁrst row of D(1)S has zeros everywhere except in the ﬁrst position
and the second row has zeros everywhere except in the ﬁrst and second positions.
These restrictions can be derived from a simple neoclassical growth model where
technological progress is non-stationary (see Fisher, 2006 and Michelacci and López-
Salido, 2007). In models with variable capital utilization and adjustment costs, the
short run marginal cost of producing capital is increasing and the price of investment
goods responds in the short run to change in investment demand. Since we only
restrict the price of investment in the long run, our identiﬁcation strategy is robust to
the existence of short run increasing marginal costs to produce investment goods.
There is controversy on how the price of investment and GDP should be deﬂated.
Fisher (2006) and Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) deﬂate both of them by the CPI
index. Altig et al. (2005) appear to deﬂate the relative price of investment with the
CPI index, and output with the output deﬂator (although they are not entirely clear
about the issue). In a closed economy, excluding indirect taxes, and discounting the
fact that the CPI only includes a subset of the consumption goods and that its weights
measures the prices paid by urban consumers, the CPI and the output deﬂator are
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are produced abroad. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we deﬂate both variables with a
output deﬂator.2 Later, we show that the choice of deﬂator does not matter.
2.1 The data
Our model has six variables X =( ∆q, ∆yn, h ,u ,s ,f )
0,w h e r e∆ denotes the ﬁrst
diﬀerence operator. The last four variables are in logs and all are multiplied by one
hundred: q equals to the inverse of the relative price of a quality-adjusted unit of new
equipment, yn is labor productivity, measured as output per hours, h is the number of
per-capita hours worked (thereafter simply hours), u i st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n ds
and f are the job separation rate and the job ﬁnding rate, respectively. The dynamics
of hours per-worker can be obtained from the responses of hours and unemployment;
those of output per-capita can be derived from the responses of labor productivity
and hours. Rather than using a standard lag selection criteria, we use a generous lag
length (8 lags) and reduce overparametrization with a prior that stochastically restrict
the lag decay toward zero assuming that the prior variance of lag j is proportional to
j−2. We choose this approach in order to avoid the problems emphasized by Giordani
(2004), Chari et al. (2008), and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007), who show that a
subset of the variables generated by standard models may display decision rules that
are not always representable with a ﬁnite order VAR. The sensitivity of the results to
the choice of lags is discussed in the robustness section.
The series for labor productivity, unemployment, and hours are from the USECON
database commercialized by Estima and are all seasonally adjusted; q until 2000 is
from Cummins and Violante (2002), who extend the Gordon (1990) measure of the
quality of new equipment, see their paper for further details. The original q series is
annual; we use Galí and Rabanal (2004) quarterly interpolated values up to 2000:IV.
We extrapolate this quarterly series up to 2010:I using NIPA account. 3 Real output
(mnemonics LXNFO) and the aggregate number of hours worked (LXNFH) correspond to
2One can show that this approach is consistent with the balanced growth conditions of a well deﬁned
open economy, see Kehoe and Ruhl (2007) for a similar point and Section 7 for further discussion.
3Several authors have constructed price of investment series directly from NIPA accounts (see
for example Justiniano et al. (2010). These series are not very highly correlated with the original
Cummins and Violante series making the comparison with the earlier literature diﬃcult.
6the non-farm business sector. The relative price of investment is expressed in output
units by subtracting to the (log of the ) original Cummings and Violante series the (log
of) the output deﬂator (LXNFI) and then adding the log of the consumption deﬂator
ln((CN+CS)/(CNH+CSH)). CN and CS are nominal consumption of non-durable and ser-
vices while CNH and CSH are the analogous values in real terms. The aggregate number
of hours worked per capita is the ratio of LXNFH to the working age population (P16).
The unemployment rate corresponds to the civilian unemployment rate. Starting from
1967:II, the monthly Current Population Survey public microdata can be used to calcu-
late the ﬂow of workers that move in and out of the three possible labor market states
(employment, unemployment, and out of the labor force). Following Shimer (2007),
we calculate exact instantaneous rates at which workers move from employment to un-
employment (ﬁnding rate) and viceversa (separation rate). The availability of workers’
ﬂows data restricts the analysis to 1967:II-2010:I period.
2.2 The low frequency comovements on the VAR
The ﬁrst graph of Figure 1 plots the log of total hours (continuous line) and the log
of the unemployment rate (dashed line). Hours display a clear cyclical pattern, highly
negatively correlated (-0.8) with the one of unemployment. Whether the two series
are stationary or exhibit persistent low frequency movements, is matter of controversy;
see, for example, Francis and Ramey (2005) and Fernald (2007).
The next two graphs of Figure 1 plot the growth rate of yn and of the relative
price of investment (equal to minus q), measured in either output units (continuous
line) or consumption units (dashed line). There is a dramatic fall in the value of q in
1974, reversed in the following years. Cummins and Violante (2002) attribute this drop
to the introduction of price controls during the Nixon era. Since price controls were
transitory, they do not aﬀect the identiﬁcation of investment speciﬁc shocks, provided
that the sample includes both the initial fall in q and its subsequent recovery. The
last graph of Figure 1 displays the log of the job ﬁn d i n gr a t ea n dt h el o go ft h ej o b
separation rate. The job ﬁnding rate is relatively more persistent than the separation
rate (AR1 coeﬃcient is 0.86 vs. 0.73). Given that recessions are typically associated
with a persistent fall in the job ﬁnding rate, the higher persistence of the job ﬁnding rate
is consistent with Hall (2005) and Shimer (2007) observation that cyclical ﬂuctuations
7in the unemployment rate are highly correlated with those in the job ﬁnding rate.
The low frequency co-movements of the series of interest are highlighted in Figure
2. In the ﬁrst row we follow the growth literature and choose 1973:I and 1997:I as
a break points, two dates that many consider critical to understand the dynamics of
technological progress and of the US labor market (see Greenwood and Yorokoglu,
1997, Violante, 2002, Hornstein et al. 2007). Switching these dates forward by one or
two years has no consequence on the points we make here. The rate of growth of the
relative price of investment goods was minus 1.0 per cent per quarter over the period
1967:I to 1973:I and moved to minus 1.3 per cent per quarter in the period 1973:II-
1997:I. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. During the productivity revival of the
late 1990’s the price of investment goods was falling at even a faster rate and before
2007 the growth rate of the price of investment exceeded minus 1.6 per cent per quarter.
The rate of growth of labor productivity exhibits an opposite trend. It was higher in
the 1967:I- 1973:I period than in the 1973:II-1997:I period, strongly recovered in the
late 1990’s to drop after 2007. Also in this case, subperiod diﬀerences are statistically
signiﬁcant. Shifts in technological progress occurred together with changes in the
average value of the unemployment rate, see the ﬁrst row of Figure 2.
The graphs in the second row of Figure 2 plot the trend component of labor produc-
tivity growth, the log of hours and the log unemployment obtained by using a Hodrick
Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing coeﬃcient equal to 1600. The trends are related: there
are negative comovements between productivity growth and the log of the unemploy-
ment rate and positive comovements between productivity growth and the log of hours.
T h et h i r dr o wo fF i g u r e2s h o w st h a tb o t ht h es e p a r a t i o nr a t ea n dt h eﬁnding rate
exhibit low frequency movements that mimic those of the unemployment rate.
2.3 Low-frequencies comovements and impulse responses
To show why these comovements are problematic when analyzing the responses to
technology shocks, we plot the point estimates of the responses obtained for three
diﬀerent samples: 1967:I-2010:I, 1973:II-1997:I and 1997:II-2010:I. Figure 3 displays
the responses of labor productivity, the relative price of investment, unemployment,
hours, hours per employee, the separation rate, and the ﬁn d i n gr a t et oan e u t r a ls h o c k .
Figure 4 presents the responses to an investment speciﬁcs h o c k .
8It is apparent that estimated responses to neutral shocks in the two subsamples
are similar. Yet, they look quite diﬀerent from the responses for the full sample. In
particular, the movements in the relative price of investment are stronger and those in
the separation rate weaker. Moreover the fall in hours and in the job ﬁnding rate and
the increase in unemployment are much less pronounced in the full sample than in each
sub-sample. Finally, output and labor productivity respond faster in the full sample.
Diﬀerences in the estimates can be related to the low frequency correlations previously
discussed. In the full sample, a permanent change in the rate of productivity growth
is at least partly identiﬁed as a series of neutral technology shocks. Thus, over the
period 1973:II-1997:I when productivity growth is on average lower, the full sample
speciﬁcation ﬁnds a series of negative neutral technology shocks. Since in this period
t h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n dt h es e p a r a t i o nr a t ea r ea b o v et h e i rf u l ls a m p l ea v e r a g e ,
while hours and the ﬁnding rate are below, biases emerge leading, for example, to a
lower response of the unemployment rate and of the separation rate. Similar logic
applies when comparing the responses to investment speciﬁc technology shocks in the
full sample to those in the two subsamples. 4
2.4 Discussion
Commentators have sometimes questioned our choice of break points. Some have
suggested that taking a break point as known (when in fact it is not) may bias results,
while others have suggested that a perhaps more relevant break point would be, as in
the Great Moderation literature, somewhere around the beginning of 1980. As shown
in the on-line appendices, moving forward by one or two years the break dates does not
change the conclusion that, over subsamples, the responses of the variables are similar
and diﬀerent from those of the full sample. Furthermore, visual inspection of Figure 1
indicates that none of the series displays unusual behavior in the early 1980s.
The evidence contained in ﬁgure 3 and 4 indicates that the dynamic responses of
the variables of the VAR to the two shocks are suﬃciently homogeneous over subsam-
ples. Therefore, the low frequency variations we have highlighted can be eﬀectively
taken care by adjusting the constant of the VAR and this is what we do in this paper.
4This evidence is robust to a number of standard modiﬁcations, including the use of the population-
adjusted hours produced by Francis and Ramey (2005) and the choice of the price deﬂator.
9In Canova et al. (2010), we elaborate on this issue and present cases where unac-
counted level breaks within a sample produce sign switches or an extreme pattern of
persistence in the responses, see also Fernald (2007). A simple way to eliminate the
low frequency comovements is to estimate the VAR over sub-samples. While feasible,
such an approach would be ineﬃcient, since the dynamics are roughly unchanged, and
it may cause biases, since imposing long run restrictions in a system estimated over a
small sample may distort structural estimates (see Erceg et al. 2005).
Low frequency movements in the data are the object of controversy and our choice
of eliminating them could be criticized in, at least, two ways. It could be argued, for
example, that after a prolonged period of low productivity growth and in anticipa-
tion that productivity will pick up, labor input could be lower in the period of low
productivity, making low frequency movements informative about business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations. One way to rationalize our decision of removing low frequency ﬂuctuations
is that breaks can not be forecasted so anticipatory eﬀects are not present. It could
also be argued that changes in productivity growth also aﬀect agents decisions rule,
not just the intercept. Since the dynamics in response to the shocks are very similar
in the two subsamples (and diﬀerent from the full sample where no adjustment for
low frequency movements is made), agent’s decision rules appear to be unaﬀected by
the breaks. Furthermore, once breaks in the intercepts are considered, the full sample
evidence roughly replicates the one the sub-samples, see next section.
3 The full sample results
Figure 5 plots the response of the variables of interest to a neutral technology shock
in the VAR when the intercept is deterministically broken at 1973:I and 1997:I. The
reported bands correspond to 90 percent conﬁdence intervals. We also plot the median
of the band rather than the point estimate, since the latter is known to be biased in
small samples. A neutral shock leads to an increase in unemployment and to a fall in
the aggregate number of hours. The eﬀects on hours worked per-employee are smaller
but still statistically signiﬁcant. The impact increase in unemployment is the result of
a sharp rise in the separation rate and of a signiﬁcant fall in the job ﬁnding rate. In the
quarters following the shock, the separation rate quickly returns to normal levels while
10the job ﬁnding rate takes up to twenty-ﬁve quarters to recover. Hence, the dynamics
of the job ﬁnding rate explains why unemployment responses are persistent. Output
takes about 5 quarters to signiﬁcantly respond but then gradually increases until it
reaches its new higher long-run value.
Figure 6 plots responses to an investment speciﬁc shock. An investment speciﬁc
technology shock leads to a short run increase in output and hours per capita and
a fall in unemployment. The fall of unemployment is in part due to a sharp drop
in the separation rate and in part due to an increase in the job ﬁnding rate. In the
impact period the unemployment response is, however, small and insigniﬁcant. Thus,
the increase in hours is primarily explained by the sharp and persistent increase in
the number of hours worked per employee. Hence, while labor market adjustments to
neutral technology shocks occur mainly along the extensive margin, those in response
to an investment speciﬁc technology shock mainly occur along the intensive margin.
3.1 Omitted variables
Our VAR has enough lags to make the residuals white noises. Yet, it is possible that
omitted variables play a role in the results. For example, Evans (1992) showed that
Solow residuals are correlated with a number of policy variables, therefore making
responses to Solow residuals shocks uninterpretable, while Forni and Gambetti (2010)
show that many puzzles in responses to monetary shocks could be due to omitted
variables. To check for this possibility we have correlated, up to 6 leads and 6 lags,
our two estimated technology shocks with variables which a large class of general
equilibrium models suggest as being jointly generated with neutral and investment
speciﬁc shocks, such as the consumption to output ratio, the investment to output
ratio, and the inﬂation rate. The point estimates of these correlations together with
an asymptotic 95 percent conﬁdence tunnel around zero are in Figure 7.
As the ﬁgure indicates, no variable is signiﬁcantly correlated with the neutral tech-
nology shocks we extract. On the other hand, they are indications that the consump-
tion to output ratio and inﬂation could be correlated with investment speciﬁcs h o c k sa t
some large lag. For this reason we have repeated estimation, enlarging the VAR system
to include these three new variables. Since, the dynamics of labor market variables are
aﬀected (see the on-line appendix), we continue to work with a six variable VAR.
114 The role of separation rates
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2007) have challenged the conventional view that recessions–
deﬁned as periods of sharply rising unemployment–are the result of higher job-loss
rates. They argue that recessions are mainly explained by a fall in the job ﬁnding rate.
Our responses suggest instead that the separation rate plays a major role in determining
t h ei m p a c te ﬀect of technology shocks on unemployment. This is consistent with the
evidence of Fujita and Ramey (2009) that the separation rate leads the cycle (by about
o n eq u a r t e r )w h i l et h eﬁnding rate lags it (by about two months), see also Yashiv (2007)
and Elsby et al. (2009) for similar considerations.
To further evaluate the role of the separation rate for unemployment ﬂuctuations,
w eu s eas i m p l et w os t a t em o d e lo ft h el a b o rm a r k e t( s e eJ a c k m a ne ta l . ,1 9 8 9a n d
Shimer, 2007 and 2008) and assume that the stock of unemployment evolves as:
˙ ut = S(lt − ut) − Fut (1)
where lt and ut are the size of the labor force and the stock of unemployment, respec-
tively; while S and F are the separation and ﬁnding rates in levels, respectively. The
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Shimer (2007) shows that the ﬁctional unemployment rate ˜ u closely tracks the actual
unemployment rate series, so that one can fully characterize the evolution of the stock
of unemployment just with the dynamics of labor market ﬂows. After linearizing the log
of ˜ u, we can also calculate its response using the response of (the log of) the separation
rate s and the ﬁnding rate f. Thus, we can measure the contribution of ﬁnding and
separation rates to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of ﬁctional unemployment ˜ u and evaluate
how accurately ﬁctional unemployment approximates actual unemployment.
Figure 8 reports the results. In each panel, the response of the true unemployment
rate appears with a solid line and the response of (logged) ˜ u appears with a dotted
line. The dash-dotted line corresponds to the response of (logged) ˜ u obtained if the
job ﬁnding rate had remained unchanged at its average level. It therefore represents
the contribution of the separation rate to ﬂuctuations in ﬁctional unemployment.
12The dynamics of ﬁctional unemployment after a neutral shock are explained to a
l a r g ee x t e n tb yﬂuctuations in the separation rate. Consistent with previous analy-
sis, the separation rate explains almost 90 per cent of the impact eﬀect on ﬁctional
unemployment. However, its contribution falls to 40 per cent after one quarter and
drops to 20 per cent one year after the shock. Following an investment speciﬁcs h o c k ,
unemployment falls on impact because of the fall in the separation rate.
Diﬀerences between the response of ﬁctional and actual unemployment to investment-
speciﬁc technology shocks are minimal, but there are some diﬀerences in the impact
response of actual and ﬁctional unemployment to neutral technology shocks. There are
several reasons that could explain these diﬀerences in impact responses. First there
could be responses in the ﬂo w sa tw h i c hw o r k e r sm o v ei na n do u to ft h el a b o rf o r c e
that aﬀect the unemployment rate and that are not properly taken into account by
our series for the ﬁnding and the separation rate.5 Second one has to bear in mind
that the equation (2) is just an approximation and that the ﬁctional and the actual
unemployment rates coincide only when labor market transitions are suﬃciently fast
and time periods are large enough: on impact the two series do not have to coincide.
To check our conclusions we also performed the decomposition proposed by Elsby et
al. (2009), which allows to calculate the contribution of the separation rate also out of
the steady state. The results changes very little, because the discrepancies between the
impulse responses of ﬁctional and actual unemployment rate are large just on impact,
and by deﬁnition impact eﬀects are just deviations from the steady state.
5 The contribution of technology shocks
To put our ﬁndings in the right perspective, we study whether the contribution of tech-
nology shocks to ﬂuctuations in the variables of interest is non-negligible. Otherwise,
what we uncover is an interesting intellectual curiosity without practical implications.
Table 1 reports the forecast error variance decomposition.
The combined eﬀect of neutral and investment speciﬁc shocks for output ﬂuctua-
5An earlier version of the paper showed that the participation rate is procyclical, and that the ﬂows
in and out of the labor force were generally little signiﬁcant except on impact. This indicates that
workers movements in and out of the labor force can play some role in characterizing the response of
the unemployment rate.
13tions is considerable: at the 2-8 years horizon the proportion of the variance of output
jointly explained by the two shocks is between 40 and 60 percent. The two shocks also
explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemployment and hours per-worker:
neutral technology shocks explain about 30-40 per cent of unemployment ﬂuctuations
and about 25-35 of the hours per-worker ﬂuctuations at time horizons between 2 and
8 years. Investment speciﬁc technology shocks are also important for the volatility of
these two variables: at time horizons between 2 and 8 years, they explain between 16
and 36 per cent of the variance of unemployment and between 22 and 44 percent of the
variance of hours per-worker. Interestingly, while neutral shocks are major source of
volatility in the short run, the importance of investment speciﬁcs h o c k sp i c k su pw i t h
time. Taken together, the shocks we consider explain 40-60 per cent of the volatility
of unemployment and hours at horizons between 2 and 8 years.
The message is similar when considering the two alternative sub-samples. If we stop
estimation prior to the productivity revival of the 1990s (see Panel B), the importance
of neutral shocks for output ﬂuctuations increases and while the proportion jointly
explained by the two technology shocks falls, technology shocks still explain a consid-
erable share of the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and hours per-worker. If we stop
estimation prior to the last crisis, the importance of investment speciﬁc shocks for out-
put ﬂuctuations increases, but their contribution to the ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and hour per-worker falls signiﬁcantly (see panel C).
Technology shocks are also important for labor markets ﬂows. Neutral shocks ex-
plain between 25 and 35 percent of the variability of the ﬁnding and separation rate
at horizons between 2 and 8 years. The contribution of investment speciﬁcs h o c k si s
somewhat smaller and changes with the estimation period, but in the full sample they
explain about 20-30 percent of the variability of the ﬁnding rate. In sum, the technol-
o g ys h o c k sw eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed represent major sources of ﬂuctuations in both the goods
and labor markets and induce signiﬁcant movements in labor market ﬂows.
Further evidence on the role of technology shocks can be obtained examining their
historical contribution to ﬂuctuations in unemployment, output, job ﬁnding and job
separation. In Figure 9 we present the original series (solid line) and its component
due to either neutral or investment speciﬁc shocks (dotted line), as recovered from the
VAR. All series are detrended with a Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter
14equal to 1600; grey area correspond to the NBER recessions.
The ﬁgure conﬁrms that technology shocks account for several important business
cycle episodes, including the recession of the late 80’s and the subsequent remarkably
slow labor market recovery of the early 90’s. This episode have been extensively inves-
tigated in the literature, yet its causes are still unexplained; see for example Bernanke
(2003). Two key features of the episode are that the downturn in employment was
severe and that the peak in unemployment occurred two years later than the trough
in output. This is a remarkable exception relative to other episodes, see McKay and
Reis (2007). Figure 10 zooms in on the content of ﬁgure 9 and presents output, un-
employment, ﬁnding and separation rates (solid lines) and their component due just
to technology shocks (dotted lines) in that period. The technology component and
the raw data tracks are quite close. This is mainly due to the evolution of neutral
shocks that naturally tend to induce jobless recoveries: following the initial rise in
job separation and unemployment, output increases to its new higher long run value,
while unemployment remains above trend because of the low job ﬁnding rate, which
induces a remarkably slow recovery in the labor market, see right column. It is worth
mentioning that the relationship between technology shocks and the jobless recoveries
in the 2000’s is weaker.
6 Interpreting the evidence
Our ﬁndings indicate that the separation rate is important in characterizing the labor
market response to technology shocks and that labor market adjustments to diﬀerent
technology shocks are diﬀerent. Neutral shocks exercise their eﬀects primarily along
the extensive margin of the labor market and are contractionary on employment; in-
vestment speciﬁcs h o c k sm a i n l ya ﬀect labor along the intensive margin and they are
expansionary on hours and employment. These results have important implications for
both empirical analysis and theoretical models of business cycles.
First, failure to empirically distinguish between the two types of disturbances may
lead to nonsensical representation of the dynamics following unexpected technological
improvements. Second, our results qualify the conclusions of Hall (2005) and Shimer
(2007) and show the importance to use search models with endogenous separation for
15business cycle analysis, a point emphasized also by Ramey (2008). The diﬀerence in
conclusions is partly due to our focus on correlations, conditional on technology shocks,
rather than on unconditional correlations at generic business cycle frequencies. Third,
for interpretation purposes, it is very important to decompose the response of total
hours into the response along the extensive and the intensive margin. For example,
since Galí (1999) it is common to interpret the evidence that hours fall in response
to neutral technology shocks using sticky prices models. In sticky-price models, when
technology improves and monetary policy is not accommodating enough, demand is
sluggish to respond to the shocks and ﬁrms take advantage of technology improvements
to economize on labor input. While this mechanism has its own appeal, it should most
naturally apply to the intensive margin of the labor market since changing prices is
arguably less costly than displacing workers–whose cost includes both the direct cost
of ﬁring and the value of the sunk investment in training and in job speciﬁch u m a n
capital that is lost with ﬁring (see e.g. Mankiw, 1985 and Hamermesh, 1993 for a
review of the literature). Admittedly, no formal model analyzing the trade-oﬀ between
changing prices and displacing workers exists in the literature and empirical evidence
o nt h ei s s u ei ss c a n tb u to n ec a nc o n j e c t u r et h at when the decision of changing prices
is endogenous and menu cost a-la Caballero and Engel (2007) are used, this is the
expected outcome.6 Our evidence indicates that labor market adjustments to neutral
shocks occur primarily at the extensive margin and the fall in hours is mostly caused
by the time consuming process of reallocation of workers across productive units. This
challenges the sticky prices interpretation of the phenomenon.
As stressed by Balleer (2010), our ﬁndings also challenge the conventional way of
modelling technology shocks in search models (see for example Pissarides 2000 and
Shimer, 2008), both because the labor market responses to neutral and investment
speciﬁc technology shocks are substantially diﬀerent and because neutral technology
shocks are contractionary rather than expansionary on employment. A possible inter-
pretation of the ﬁnding is that investment speciﬁc technological progress has standard
neoclassical features, while neutral shocks have Schumpeterian features so that the
6Of course this is just a conjecture, since in standard sticky price models based on Calvo pricing
ﬁrms do not explicitly pay a menu cost to change prices and the probability of price adjustment is
exogenous, see Barnichon (2010), for a model of this type.
16introduction of new neutral technologies causes the destruction of technologically ob-
solete productive units and the creation of new technologically advanced ones. When
the labor market features search frictions, this process leads to a temporary rise in
unemployment. Schumpeterian creative destruction matters for productivity dynam-
ics at the micro level, see Foster et al. (2001) and it is a prominent paradigm in the
growth literature, see Aghion and Howitt (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998),
Violante (2002) and Hornstein et al. (2007). Apart from Michelacci and López-Salido
(2007), we are not aware of papers using this paradigm to interpret the response of
worker ﬂows to technology shocks. In their model, newly created jobs embody the
most advanced technologies (both neutral and investment speciﬁc )a v a i l a b l ea tt h e
time of their creation while existing jobs may fail to upgrade their previously installed
technologies. The idea is that the adoption of new technologies requires the perfor-
mance of some new worker-speciﬁc tasks, so workers initially hired to operate speciﬁc
technologies may not be suitable for their upgrading. In their model the short run
response of the economy to a technology shock may be expansionary or contractionary
on employment depending on how easily old jobs upgrade their technology and reap the
beneﬁts of technological advancements. When old-jobs’ technology can not be easily
upgraded, technological progress causes a wave of Schumpeterian creative destruction
characterized by a simultaneous increase in the destruction of obsolete productive units
and in the creation of new technologically advanced ones. Based on micro evidence on
technology dynamics at the ﬁrm level, Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) argue that
only technologies embodied in capital can be readily upgraded. As a result, a neutral
technology shock prompts a wave of Schumpeterian creative destruction where job cre-
ation, job destruction and unemployment simultaneously increase, while the adoption
of investment speciﬁc technologies operate essentially as in the standard neoclassical
growth model, leading to an expansion in economic activity.
7R o b u s t n e s s
This section describes some robustness exercises whose outcomes are documented in
the on-line appendix. The main conclusions of these exercises is that our technology
shocks are unlikely to stand in for other sources of disturbances and that the results
17stand when we change i) the lag length of the VAR, ii) the way we remove low frequency
ﬂuctuations, iii) the timing of identifying restrictions, iv) the price deﬂator, v) the labor
market data and the relative price of investment series.
Other disturbances Despite the fact that our technology shocks do not proxy for
omitted variables, it is still possible that they stand in for other sources of disturbances.
To check for this possibility, we have correlated the estimated technology shocks with
o i lp r i c e ss h o c k s( m n e m o n i c sPZTEXP)d e ﬂated by the consumption deﬂator and federal
fund rate shocks (FFED), both computed ﬁltering these two series with an AR(1).
Correlations are insigniﬁcant up to 6 leads and 6 lags.
VAR lag length The issue of the length of VAR has been recently brought back
to the attention of applied researchers by Giordani (2004) and Chari et al. (2008),
who show that the aggregate decision rules of a subset of the variables of a model may
h a v en o ta l w a y sb er e p r e s e n t a b l ew i t haﬁnite order VAR. This issue is unlikely to be
important in our context since we have checked that the residuals of a VAR(8) are
white noise and do not stand-in for other potential sources of shocks. To conﬁrm this
we have reestimated our VAR using 4 lags. The pattern of responses is unchanged
because the prior eﬀectively removes the noise that longer lags produce in the VAR.
Alternative treatments of trends We have considered two alternatives to the
dummy approach we employ to remove low frequency movements in the variables of
the VAR: we have allowed up to a third order polynomial in time as intercept in the
VAR; we ﬁltered all the variables, before entering them in the VAR, with the Hodrick
Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter λ = 12800. In both cases responses have
the same shape and approximately the same size as in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
Medium versus long-run identifying restrictions Uhlig (2004) has argued
that disturbances other than neutral technology shocks may have long run eﬀects on
labor productivity and that, in theory, there is no horizon at which neutral (and invest-
ment speciﬁc) shocks fully account for the variability of labor productivity. Literally,
this implies the neutral shocks we have extracted may not be structural. To take care
18of this problem, Uhlig suggests to check if conclusions change when medium term re-
strictions are used. We have recomputed our responses imposing the restrictions that
the two shocks are the sole source of ﬂuctuations in labor productivity and the price of
investment is imposed at the time horizon of 3 years rather than in the long-run. The
sign and the shape of responses are almost unchanged. Similar results are obtained if
the restrictions are imposed at any horizon of at least one year.
Price deﬂators I no u rb e n c h m a r kV A R ,l a b o rp r o d u ctivity and the relative price
of investment are deﬂated with the output deﬂa t o r-t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt ou s ed o m e s -
tic consumption as a numeraire. As mentioned, other authors have either used the
CPI deﬂator or combination of output and CPI deﬂators. Such choice is potentially
problematic since the identifying assumptions are no longer valid with such deﬂators.
To see this recall that when the price of investment and total factor productivity
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where small letters denote the log of the corresponding quantities in capital letters and
v is a stationary term, accounting for transitional dynamics. Hence, in the long run
labour productivity is due to the neutral and the investment speciﬁcs h o c k s .
Now, let qc and yc
n denote the inverse of the relative price of investment and labor











,w h e r ePH
c and PF
c are the prices of consumption goods
produced in the US and abroad; and a represents the share of domestic consumption
goods. Tedious calculations show that
y
c
n = cte +
1
1 − α − β
z +
α + β














19where α and β are the output elasticities to domestic and foreign capital, respectively.
Hence, with this choice of numeraire, a permanent change in the real exchange rate
could aﬀect long run labor productivity and confused with “neutral” technology shocks
( s e ea l s oK e h o ea n dR u h l ,2 0 0 8 ) . S i n c et h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ee x h i b i t sr e m a r k a b l e
persistence, one should worry about mixing neutral and real exchange rate shocks.
When we deﬂate the relative price of investment with the CPI index and output
with the GDP deﬂator we obtain
yn = cte +
1
1 − α − β
z +
α + β














and, again, a permanent change in pH
c − pF
c has long run eﬀects on productivity.
Our choice of deﬂator is the right one, in the sense that it implies a well deﬁned
balanced growth path in an open economy version of the Solow model, and does not
suﬀer from misspeciﬁcation issues. Figure 1 indicates that the diﬀerence due to the use
of an incorrect price deﬂator are small. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating whether
the results we obtain could be altered if the CPI deﬂator is used. Responses are roughly
similar to our benchmark ones. The main diﬀerence concerns the response of the price
of investment to a neutral technology shock, which is now more pronounced.
Alternative data sets Elsby et al. (2009) have recently calculated an alter-
native series for the job ﬁnding and job separation rates, by slightly modifying the
methodology of Shimer (2007). Our results are unchanged when this alternative series
for labor market ﬂo w si su s e di nt h eV A R .
An earlier version of the paper (see Canova, et al., 2009) also used Shimer’s (2007)
approximate ﬁnding and separation rates, which are available from 1948 and results
were broadly similar. These rates are constructed from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics data for employment, unemployment, and unemployment duration to obtain the
instantaneous (continuous time) rate at which workers move from employment to un-
employment and viceversa. The two measures, which are quarterly averages of monthly
rates, are calculated under the assumption that employment and unemployment are
the only two possible states of the labor market. Since they abstract from workers’
labor force participation decisions, they approximate the true labor market rates at
w h i c hu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r sﬁnd a new job and employed workers lose their job.
20It is also worth mentioning that if one uses the q series directly obtained from the
NIPA table (as e.g. in Justiniano et al., 2010), the responses to investment speciﬁc
shocks change somewhat. The series we use and the one obtained from the NIPA
table are positively but not perfectly correlated. In addition, the average growth
rate of the variable is diﬀerent. Which series should be used in both structural and
semi-structural estimation exercises is unclear and future work should explore in more
details the construction of the appropriate price of investment series.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analyzed the eﬀects of neutral and investment speciﬁc technology shocks on
unemployment, job ﬁnding, job separation rates and other labor market variables. We
show that positive neutral technology shocks aﬀect labor market variables primarily
along the extensive margin and substantially increase unemployment. Positive invest-
ment speciﬁc technology shocks, on the other hand, expand aggregate hours worked,
both because hours per-worker increase and because unemployment falls, but the in-
tensive margin contributes most to the adjustments. For both shocks, the short run
response of unemployment is almost entirely due to the instantaneous response of the
separation rate while movements in the ﬁnding rate account for the dynamic adjust-
ments of unemployment. Thus, positive neutral shocks can cause recessions and the
induced ﬂows in and out of unemployment are in line with the conventional wisdom:
unemployment initially rises because of a wave of layoﬀs and remains high because the
job ﬁnding rate takes time to recover. Technology shocks explain over 50 per cent of
the cyclical ﬂuctuations in labor market variables and around 30 percent of ﬂuctuations
in workers ﬂows and accurately characterize the “jobless” recovery of the early 90’s.
Our ﬁndings are robust to a number of speciﬁcation choices, to the selection of price
deﬂators and to changes in auxiliary assumptions.
The evidence we uncover casts doubts on the recent tendency to use search models
with exogenous separation rates to analyze the eﬀects of technology shocks. It also chal-
lenges the standard sticky price explanation for why hours fall in response to neutral
technology shocks. The evidence may instead be consistent with the idea that invest-
ment speciﬁc technological progress has standard neoclassical features, while neutral
21technological progress is Schumpeterian. According to this view the introduction of
new neutral technologies causes the destruction of technologically obsolete productive
units and the creation of new technologically advanced ones. When the labor market
is characterized by search frictions, these adjustments lead to a temporary rise in un-
employment (see e.g. Canova et al., 2007). If correct, this interpretation questions the
conventional way of modelling technology shocks in search models.
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27Variable Neutral Investment speci￿c
Horizon (quarters) Horizon (quarters)
1 8 16 32 1 8 16 32
A:Full sample
Output 1 3 15 32 16 34 34 27
Hours 31 21 16 12 28 49 58 63
Hours per Worker 52 41 33 26 2 22 34 44
Unemployment 57 43 37 30 1 16 27 36
Finding Rate 22 35 31 26 1 11 22 33
Separation Rate 37 35 34 33 3 11 14 16
B. 1967:II-1997:IV sample
Output 1 6 27 48 4 31 35 25
Hours 24 17 10 6 16 45 62 70
Hours per Worker 44 31 25 21 3 11 26 37
Unemployment 43 33 29 26 8 7 18 27
Finding Rate 17 30 28 27 9 4 9 13
Separation Rate 28 26 25 23 1 7 12 16
C. 1967:II-2007:I sample
Output 2 10 25 47 7 35 40 38
Hours 14 12 8 7 18 42 58 67
Hours per Worker 35 32 28 26 1 7 17 25
Unemployment 36 35 33 31 5 4 9 14
Finding Rate 8 24 24 23 5 3 7 10
Separation Rate 21 28 28 28 1 2 4 5
Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: percentage of the forecast error variance explained
by neutral and investment-speci￿c technology shocks. The VAR has siz variables and intercept deter-
ministically broken at 1973:II and 1997:I. The variables of the VAR are the growth in the relative price
of investment and in labor productivity, hours per capita, the unemployment rate, the job separation
and the job ￿nding rate, the consumption to output ratio, the investment to output ratio, and the
in￿ ation rate.
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Figure 1. First graph: the continuous line is the log of the aggregate number of hours worked
per-capita; the dashed line is the log of civilian unemployment. Second graph: the continuous line is
the growth rate of labor productivity in the non-farm business sector, measured in output units; the
dashed line the same variable, measured in consumption units. Third graph: the continuous line is
the growth rate of the relative price of investment goods measured in output units; the dashed line
the same variable measured in consumption units. Fourth graph: the continuous line is the log of job
￿nding rate and the dashed line is the log of job separation rate.
28Growth of relative price of investment and unemployment




















Growth of labor productivity and log hours




















Log Finding and log unemployment












Growth of labor productivity and unemployment



















Growth of labor productivity and log unemployment
















Log Separation and log unemployment

















Figure 2.First graph: the continuous line is the average quarterly growth rate of the relative price of
investment and the dashed line the unemployment rate. Second graph: the continuous line is the
average quarterly growth rate of labour productivity and the dashed line the unemployment rate.
Third graph: the continuous line is the Hodrick Prescott trend of labor productivity growth and the
dashed line hours per-capita. Fourth graph: the continuous line is the Hodrick Prescott trend of
labor productivity growth and the dashed line and unemployment rate. Fifth and sixth graph: the
continuous lines are the Hodrick Prescott trend of ￿nding and separation rates and the dashed line is
the unemployment rate. The smoothing coe¢ cient is ￿ = 1600:
29Neutral Technology Shock
67:I-10:I (continuous), 97:II-10:I (dotted), 73:II-97:I (dash-dotted)
Relative price of investment

























































Figure 3. Responses to a one-standard deviation neutral shock. Each line corresponds to a six
variable VAR(8) with the rate of growth of the relative price of investment, the rate of growth of
labour productivity, the (logged) unemployment rate, and the (logged) aggregate number of hours
worked per capita, the log of separation and ￿nding rates.
30Investment Specific Shock
67:I-10:I (continuous), 97:II-10:I (dotted), 73:II-97:I (dash-dotted)
Relative price of investment


























































Figure 4. Responses to a one-standard deviation investment speci￿c shock. Each line corresponds to
a six variable VAR(8) with the rate of growth of the relative price of investment, the rate of growth
of labour productivity, the (logged) unemployment rate, and the (logged) aggregate number of hours
worked per-capita, the log of separation and ￿nding rates.
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Relative Price of Investment




















































Figure 5. Responses to a one-standard deviation shock. Sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept
deterministically broken at 1973:II and 1997:I. Six variables VAR(8). Dotted lines are 5% and 95%
quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of
the VAR. The continuous line is the median estimate.
32Investment Specific Shock
Relative Price of Investment

























































Figure 6. Responses to a one-standard deviation shock. Sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept
deterministically broken at 1973:II and 1997:I.Six variables VAR(8). Dotted lines are 5% and 95%
quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of
the VAR. The continuous line is the median estimate.
33Correlation with omitted variables
Neutral shock


















Figure 7. Sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically broken at 1973:II and 1997:I.
Plotted are the correlations of the neutral shocks (left column) and investment speci￿c shock (right
column) with the consumption-output ratio, the investment-output ratio andthe in￿ ation rate. The
shocks are estimated from the six variables VAR(8). The two horizontal lines correspond to an
asymptotic 95 percent con￿dence interval for the null of zero correlation.
34Contribution of Separation rate
u (continuous), u-fictional (dotted), Separation only (dash-dotted)
Neutral Shock











Figure 8. Six variables VAR(8). Sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically broken at
1973:II and 1997:I. Reported are median estimates from 500 bootstrap replications.
35Data and Technology component
Unemployment


























Figure 9. Technology shocks and labor market ￿ uctuations. The solid line refers to raw data, the
dashed lines to the component due to technology shock (either neutral or investment speci￿c) as
recovered from the six variables VAR(8). Sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically
broken at 1973:II and 1997:I. All series are detrended with a Hodrick Prescott ￿lter with smoothing
parameter equal to 1600:The areas in grey correspond to the NBER recessions.
36Figure 10. The jobless recovery of the 90s. Solid lines are raw data (either unemployment, ￿nding
rates, separation rates or output), the dashed lines the component due to technology shocks (either
neutral or investment speci￿c) as recovered from the six variables VAR(8) Sample 1967:II-2010:I
with intercept deterministically broken at 1973:II and 1997:I. All series are detrended with a Hodrick
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(a) Neutral technology shock (b) investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-1: The sample period is 1973:I-1997:I. The VAR has eight lags and contains: the rate
of growth of the relative price of investment, the rate of growth of labour productivity, the (logged)
job ￿nding rate, the (logged) job separation rate, the (logged), unemployment rate (logged), and
the (logged) aggregate number of hours worked per capita. Dotted lines represent the 5% and 95%
quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of
the VAR. The continuous line corresponds to median estimate from bootstrap replications.
A-2Neutral Shock
Relative Price of Investment
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(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-2: The sample period is 1967:II-1997:I. The VAR has eight lags and contains: the rate
of growth of the relative price of investment, the rate of growth of labour productivity, the (logged)
job ￿nding rate, the (logged) job separation rate, the (logged), unemployment rate (logged), and
the (logged) aggregate number of hours worked per capita. Dotted lines represent the 5% and 95%
quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of
the VAR. The continuous line corresponds to median estimate from bootstrap replications.
A-3Neutral Shock
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(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-3: The sample period is 1967:II-2007:I. The VAR has 8 lags and contaians: the rate of
growth of the relative price of investment, the rate of growth of labour productivity, the (logged) un-
employment rate, and the (logged) aggregate number of hours worked per capita, the log of separation
and ￿nding rates. Dotted lines represent the 5% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the responses
simulated by bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of the VAR. The continuous line corresponds to
median estimate from bootstrap replications.
A-4Neutral Technology Shock
67:I-10:I (continuous), 97:II-10:I (dotted), 75:II-97:I (dash-dotted)
Relative price of investment
























































67:I-10:I (continuous), 97:II-10:I (dotted), 75:II-97:I (dash-dotted)
Relative price of investment






















































(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-4: Responses to a one-standard deviation shocks in the samples: 1967:II-2010:I, 1975:II-
1997:I, and 1997:II-2010:I. Each line corresponds to a six variable VAR(8) with the rate of growth of
the relative price of investment, the rate of growth of labour productivity, the (logged) unemployment
rate, and the (logged) aggregate number of hours worked per capita, the log of separation and ￿nding
rates.
A-5Neutral Shock
Relative Price of Investment























































Relative Price of Investment
























































(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-5: Response to a neutral or an investment-speci￿c technology shock in a six variables
VAR(8), 1967:II-2010:I sample with intercept deterministically broken at 1973:I and 1997:I. Dotted
lines represent the 5% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by bootstrap-
ping 500 times the residuals of the VAR. The continuous line corresponds to median estimate.
A-6Neutral Shock
Dummy (continuous), Polynomial (dotted), HP (dashed)
Relative price of investment



























































Dummy (continuous), Polynomial (dotted), HP (dashed)
Relative price of investment
























































(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-6: Six variable VAR with 8 lags, sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically
broken at 1973:1 and 1997:I. The continous line has responses for the dummy speci￿cation, the dotted
line responses where the intercept is a 3rd order polynomial in time, the dashed lines are responses
after ￿ltering with an Hodrick Prescott ￿lter and smoothing parameter ￿ = 12800.
A-7Neutral Shock
Relative Price of Investment
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(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-7: Six variable VAR with 4 lags, sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically
broken at 1973:1 and 1997:I. Dotted lines represent the 5% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of
the responses simulated by bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of the VAR; the solid line is the
median of the distribution.
A-8Neutral Shock
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(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-8: Six variable VAR with 8 lags, sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically
broken at 1973:1 and 1997:I. Identifycation restrictions imposed at medium horizon (12 quarters).
Dotted lines represent the 5% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by
bootstrapping 500 times the residuals of the VAR; the continuous line is the median of the distribution.
A-9Neutral Shock
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(a) Neutral technology shock (b) Investment speci￿c technology shock
Figure A-9: Six variable VAR with 8 lags, sample 1967:II-2010:I with intercept deterministically
broken at 1973:1 and 1997:I. The variables in VAR are de￿ ated with a consumer price index. Dotted
lines represent the 5% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the responses simulated by bootstrap-
ping 500 times the residuals of the VAR; the continuous line is the median of the distribution.
A-10